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The Obscene Record Bill: 
An Examination of the 
Constitutionality of 
Maryland H.B. 111 
I n the 1986 session of the Maryland General Assembly a great deal of pub-lic attention was focused on the so-
called "Obscene Record Bill." The intro-
duction of this bill was an attempt to deal 
with the problem of record lyrics which 
various persons and organizations deemed 
indecent, obscene, and harmful to the 
youth of this state and the country. While 
the bill was not enacted into law, it did 
focus public attention on this specific 
problem. One specific example of the type 
of lyric that these people and groups seek 
to regulate is the song "Darling Nikki," 
from Prince's Grammy and Oscar award-
winning alb1:lffi Purple Rain, which con-
tains the following verse: "I knew a girl 
named NikkiJI guess you could say she was 
a sex fiend.!I met her in a hotel lobby/Mas-
turbating with a magazine.!She said 'how'd 
u like to waste sometime?/And I couldn't 
resist when I saw/Little Nikki grind." 1 
One particular organization, the Par-
ents' Music Resource Center (PMRC), 
was established in 1985 to help alleviate 
this problem. Its mission is "to get the 
music world to clean up its act." 2 The 
PMRC has proposed several methods of 
dealing with the problem of obscene lyrics 
and their effect on children. First, they 
want record companies to voluntarily label 
records using a rating system similar to that 
used to rate motion pictures. The rating 
system would label those records whose 
lyrics deal with such subjects as violence, 
sex, suicide, drugs and alcohol, or the oc-
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cult. 3 Second, the PMRC would like all 
lyrics to be printed on record covers to en-
able parents to better decide what their 
children should listen to. 4 Finally, the 
PMRC wants to establish "a nationwide 
'Media Watch' to 'monitor radio and TV 
stations consistently for a period of time' 
and 'record the objectionable words/songs/ 
scenes.''' 5 
Another attempt to deal with this partic-
ular problem is through the use oflegisla-
tion to protect children from these allegedly 
obscene lyrics. One Maryland legislator, 
Del. Joseph E. Owens, described sexually 
oriented lyrics as "filth" and "slime" and 
declared that its distribution is "probably 
the worst type of child abuse we've got .. . 
this is mass child abuse, that's what it is .. . 
slime affecting children." 6 This article 
will examine one such legislative attempt 
to deal with this problem in light of the 
constitutional limitations and practical con-
siderations involved. 
A bill was introduced in the 1986 session 
of the Maryland General Assembly which 
was designed to prohibit the sale, rental, 
distribution, or advertising of obscene 
records, tapes, or compact discs to persons 
under the age of eighteen. 7 The bill, H.B. 
Ill, would add phonograph records, mag-
netic tapes, and compact or laser discs to 
the list of other obscene materials which 
were already enumerated in the Maryland 
statute prohibiting the sale, distribution, 
or advertising of obscene materials to mi-
nors.8 After its introduction, H.B. III 
was passed by the House of Delegates by a 
vote of 96 to 11.9 The bill was then sent 
to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Com-
mittee, where public hearings were held 
and the bill was defeated by a vote of 7 
to 4. 10 
The statute, as amended by this bill, 
would have read: 
(a)(l) A person may not willfully or 
knowingly engage in the business of 
selling, showing, advertising for sale, 
or distributing to any person under 
the age of 18 years any still picture, 
photograph, book, pocket book, pam-
phlet, magazine, video disc, [or] video 
tape, PHONOGRAPH RECORD, 
MAGNETIC TAPE, COMPACT 
OR LASER DISC the cover or con-
tent of which is principally made up of 
descriptions or depictions of illicit 
sex, or which consists of pictures nude 
or partially denuded figures posed or 
presented in a manner which an aver-
age person applying contemporary 
community standards would find, 
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient 
interest and lacks serious literary, ar-
tistic, political or scientific value. 
(2) An owner, operator, franchisee, 
manager, or any employee with man-
agerial responsibility of a newsstand 
or any other place of business may not 
openly and knowingly display at the 
newsstand or other place of business, 
ifit is frequented by persons under the 
age of18 years, any of the items whose 
sale, showing, or advertising is pro-
hibited by paragraph (1) of this sub-
section. 
(3) Violation of this section is a mis-
demeanor. 
(b) In this section the following words 
have the meanings indicated: 
(1) "Description or depictions ofillicit 
sex" shall mean: 
(i) Human genitals in a state of sex-
ual stimulation or arousal; 
(ii) Acts of human masturbation, 
sexual intercourse, or sodomy; or 
(iii) Fondling or other erotic touch-
ing of human genitals. 
(2) "Distributing" includes renting. 
(3) "Nude or partially denuded fig-
ures" means: 
(i) Less than completely and opaquely 
covered human genitals, pubic region, 
buttocks, or female breast below a 
point immediately above the top of the 
areola; or 
(ii) Human II}ale genitals in a dis-
cernibly turgid state, even if com-
pletely and opaquely covered. ll 
The First Amendment states that "Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech or of the press .... " 12 
The freedoms granted by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments are not and have 
never been treated as absolutes. 13 There 
are various types of freedoms that the Su-
preme Court has held to be restricted. 14 
Obscenity is not within the area of the 
protected speech or press under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The states 
have the power to enact statutes designed 
to regulate obscene materials, but such 
regulations must be carefully limited. 15 
After numerous efforts at defining oQscen-
ity, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Cali-
forma,16 finally established a three part 
test for determining whether certain ma-
terials are obscene. The Miller test is as 
follows: 
(a) whether "the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community stan-
dards" would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient in-
terest; (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law; and (c) whether 
the work taken as a whole, lacks seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value,l1 
It is clear that any material which is con-
sidered obscene for adults will also be 
considered obscene for children. The prob-
lem which arises, and is particularly ap-
parent in examining H.B. Ill, involves 
regulating the distribution of material to 
children which would not be considered 
obscene for adults. 
In order to analyze the rights of children 
as to their constitutional rights, particu-
larly First Amendment rights, it is neces-
sary to acknowledge a child's less than full 
capacity for choice. 18 Children are pre-
sumed to be incapable of making mature, 
competent, and responsible choices. 19 
The Supreme Court has stated that, "Chil-
dren, by definition, are not assumed to 
have the capacity to take care of them-
selves." 20 
Society looks first to the parents to make 
decisions on behalf of their children.21 In 
those situations "[w]here the parents lack 
the [necessary] power to make their au-
thority over the listening and reading ac-
tivities of their children effective, they 
may seek to invoke the [state's] power and 
resources ... to reinforce their supervi-
sion." 22 "[T]he State has an interest 'to 
protect the welfare of children' and to see 
that they are 'safeguarded from abuses' 
which might prevent their 'growth into 
free and independent well-developed men 
and citizens.'" 23 
The Supreme Court first addressed the 
problem of the state's power to regulate 
children's access to materials considered 
obscene to them, but not to adults, in the 
1968 case of Ginsberg v. New York. 24 In 
Ginsberg, the defendant was convicted for 
selling "girlie" magazines to minors under 
a New York State statute which prohibited 
the sale to persons under seventeen years 
of age of material defined to be obscene to 
minors.25 The statute's definition of ob-
scenity as to minors conformed to the Roth 
test and included material which: "(i) pre-
dominately appeals to the prurient, shame-
ful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is 
patently offensive to prevailing standards 
in the adult community as a whole with 
respect to what is suitable material for mi-
nors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming 
social importance for minors." 26 
The N ew York statute was held to be 
constitutional by the Ginsberg court, 
thereby establishing the constitutionality 
of the variable obscenity test for minors. 
The Court held that the statute, in defin-
ing obscenity on the basis of its appeal to 
minors, did not involve an invasion of the 
constitutionally protected freedoms ofmi-
nors,21 Holding that the well-being of chil-
dren was within New York's constitutional 
power to regulate, the Court found two in-
terests to justify the limitations imposed 
by the statute: (1) "[C]onstitutional inter-
pretation has consistently recognized that 
the parents' claim to authority in their own 
household to direct the rearing of their 
children is basic in the structure of our 
society; "28 and (2) "The State also has an 
independent interest in the well-being of 
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its youth." 29 Finally, the Court upheld the 
statute on the basis that it was rationally 
related t~ the objective of safeguarding 
minors from harm. 30 
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,31 
the Supreme Court examined the constitu-
tionality of a city ordinance prohibiting 
the exhibition of films containing nudity 
by a drive-in theatre when its screen is vis-
ible from a public street or place. Among' 
the arguments made in support of the or-
dinance's constitutionality was that it was 
"an exercise of the city's undoubted police 
power to protect children." 32 
The Court recognized the rule of Gins-
berg that a state or municipality can adopt 
regulations imposing stricter controls on 
materials available to children than on 
those available to adults. Minors are still 
entitled to a significant portion of their 
First Amendment protections and the gov-
ernment may only prohibit the public dis-
semination of protected materials to minors 
if done in relatively narrow and well-defined 
circumstances. 33 The city's argument was 
rejected by the Court based on its finding 
that the ordinance was broader than per-
missible. 34 
The Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation,35 addressed the authority of 
the FCC to regulate broadcasting of inde-
cent speech. In Pacifica, the FCC issued a 
declaratory order against the broadcaster 
under its power to control the use ofvul-
garity in broadcasting under the statute 
forbidding the use of "any obscene, inde-
cent, or profane language by means of radio 
communications." 36 The case involved 
the broadcasting of a monologue by co-
median George Carlin, entitled "Filthy 
Words," which was aired by Pacifica's 
radio station in mid-afternoonY The FCC 
characterized the language used in the 
monologue as "patently offensive," but not 
necessarily obscene.38 
Pacifica's primary constitutional claim 
was that the First Amendment forbids any 
abridgments of the right to broadcast ma-
terial which is not obscene. 39 The Court 
rejected this argument based on two dis-
tinctions between broadcasting and other 
forms of communication. First, the per-
vasive presence of the broadcast media 
allows it to confront adults with inde-
cent material in the privacy of their own 
homes. 4o Second, the Court stated that 
"[t]he ease with which children may ob-
tain access to broadcast material, coupled 
with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, 
amply justify special treatment ofindecent 
broadcasting." 41 
The Maryland proposal, H.B. 111, would 
be the first statute in the country to pro-
hibit the sale or distribution of obscene 
records or tapes to minors. An analysis of 
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the constitutionality of the bill, if passed, 
must be based upon the principles set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg, 
Erznoznik, and Pacifica and those cases 
which have examined similar state and 
municipal laws in light of these Supreme 
Court cases. 
Those cases which have examined the 
constitutionality of state and local laws, 
have done so on a number of constitutional 
issues including: (1) vagueness, (2) over-
breadth, (3) equal protection, and (4) prior 
restraint. The challenged statutes dealt 
with both the sale or distribution of ob-
scene materials to minors and the display 
of those materials. 
Various state statutes and municipal 
ordinances have been challenged on the 
ground of vagueness. The primary con-
cerns of the vagueness doctrine are to pro-
vide actual notice as to what the particular 
statute commands or forbids and to set 
forth minimal guidelines to govern law en-
forcement. 42 The purpose of striking down 
statutes which are held to be vague is to 
prevent the arbitrary enforcement of laws 
which fail to give notice to officials or 
the public of what conduct or material is 
prohibited. 43 
. . . the government 
may only prohibit 
the public 
dissemination of 
protected materials 
to minors if done 
in relatively narrow 
and well-defined 
circumstances. 
Those laws threatening to inhibit First 
Amendment freedoms require that a more 
stringent vagueness test be used.44 The 
Supreme Court has enumerated three im-
portant values which are offended in the 
First Amendment area by vague laws. 
First, individuals are not given fair warn-
ing of what is prohibited. Second, the lack 
of precise standards permits arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Finally, vague 
statutes encroach upon First Amendment 
freedoms by causing citizens to forsake 
engaging in protected activities for fear it 
may be prohibited. 45 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, in M.S. News Company 
v. Casado,46 examined a Wichita, Kansas 
ordinance which prohibited the promotion 
of sexually oriented materials to minors. 
The court found that the ordinance was 
not vague and set forth three reasons for its 
findings: (1) "the ordinance provides fair 
warning of what is prohibited; "47 (2) it did 
"not perceive any real danger of arbitrary 
enforcement;" 48 and (3) it was "not per-
suaded that the ordinance will lead citizens 
to forsake activity protected by the First 
Amendment." 49 
In American Booksellers Association v. 
McAuliffe,50 the court held that it "must 
apply the same constitutional standards re-
lating to vagueness that it would apply ifit 
were dealing with a statute pertaining to 
adults." 51 The court found several grounds 
to support its finding that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague. First, it found 
that the language of the act was vague as to 
the materials prohibited and the manner of 
complying with the act.52 Second, the 
court held that certain terms in the act 
were without a definite meaning and, 
therefore, unconstitutionally vague. 53 
There have also been several state laws 
and municipal ordinances which have 
been challenged on the ground that they 
are unconstitutionally overbroad. The 
basis of the overbreadth doctrine argument 
is that the particular state or local law re-
stricts the access of both adults and minors 
to materials w,hich are constitutionally 
permissible. 54 The primary purpose of 
striking down an overbroad statute is to 
"assure the public that the dissemination 
of materials protected by the First Amend-
ment will not be suppressed." 55 The Su-
preme Court has stated that invalidating 
legislation as overbroad on its face is "man-
ifestly strong medicine" which should be 
employed sparingly and "only as a last 
resort." 56 
In American Booksellers Association v. 
McAultffe,57 the court addressed the issue 
of whether the statute was overbroad as to 
both adults and minors. The statute pro-
hibited the sale or display of certain ma-
terials which were deemed to be harmful 
to minors. The court reiterated the three 
part obscenity test, as set forth in Miller, 
and stated that any materials which did not 
satisfy the test were protected under the 
First Amendment. 58 The court examined 
the act and determined that it infringes on 
the protected rights of adults because 
"[t]he language includes a public display 
prohibition which necessarily prevents 
perusal by, and limits sale to, adults." 59 
The McAultffe court then compared the 
Georgia statute with the New York statute 
which was upheld by the Supreme Court 
in Ginsberg to determine if it was over-
broad as to minors. The court held the 
statute to be overbroad because it lacked 
the guidelines set forth in Ginsberg. 60 
The court in Rushia v. Town of Ashburn-
ham,61 examined a local ordinance pro-
hibiting the sale or display of indecent 
publications to minors, to determine if it 
was constitutionally overbroad. While the 
court recognized the state's interest in pro-
tecting its children allows a greater degree 
of control over communicative materials 
available to them,62 it found that the or-
dinance also infringed on the rights of 
adults. 63 There were several reasons given 
by the court to support its conclusion. 
First, it held that the terms of the ordi-
nance were much more sweeping than 
Miller and could potentially deter a sub-
stantial range of constitutionally protected 
expression.64 Second, the ordinance was 
broader than the statute upheld in Gins-
berg because it was not limited to materials 
which are obscene as to minors. 65 
Most recently, in American Booksellers 
Association, Inc. v. Virginia,66 the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined 
an amendment to the Virginia obscenity 
statute prohibiting display of books with 
sexual content deemed harmful to juve-
niles. 67 The court held that the amend-
ment was facially invalid for overbreadth 
because it discourages the exercise of first 
amendment rights in a real and substantial 
manner, and is not readily subject to a nar-
rowing interpretation as to withstand an 
overbreadth challenge. 68 
The court in M.S. News Co. also ad-
dressed the question of whether the mu-
nicipal ordinance in question was over-
broad.69 The ordinance was held not to be 
overbroad for two reasons. First, the court 
held that "the ordinance has a clear and ac-
ceptable standard that will permit sale or 
distribution to adults of such materials." 70 
Second, the portion of the ordinance deal-
ing with the display of materials which are 
harmful to minors is reasonably written 
and any restrictions of the rights of adults 
to view these materials is reasonable,11 
Several cases challenging these various 
statutes as unc9nstitutional have done so 
on the basis that these laws are violative of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 72 One such challenge 
was made in the case of M.S. News Co. v. 
Casado,73 in which the ordinance in ques-
tion distinguished between commercial 
and non-commercial enterprises; The court, 
recognizing that the material involved was 
obscene and therefore not subject to First 
Amendment protections, stated that "[s]uch 
classifications are upheld if they are ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state inter-
est." 74 Applying this standard, the court 
determined that the distinction did bear a 
rational relationship to a legitimate state 
interest and that the ordinance did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause.75 
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Tat-
tered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley,76 held that a 
state statute distinguishing private, com-
mercial bookstores from other entities, 
such as school bookstores, libraries, and 
museums, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. The court acted under the 
presumption that the materials involved 
were not obscene and therefore entitled to 
the freedom of speech provisions of the 
First Amendment. 77 
When fundamental rights, such as the 
First Amendment right of free speech, are 
affected, the classifications in terms of the 
ability to exercise these rights must be 
judged against a strict scrutiny test.78 The 
burden is upon the government to estab-
lish that the law is necessarily related to a 
compelling governmental interest. 79 The 
court in Tattered Cover concluded that 
"there is no compelling or overriding jus-
tification shown by the state in this case 
which supports the classification." 80 
The argument has also been made th'at 
these statutes and ordinances create an im-
permissible prior restraint on an individ-
ual's freedoms of speech and expression. 
Generally, the government may not regu-
late in advance what expressions may be 
uttered or published, even if such speech 
would be unconstitutional if spoken or 
published.81 The Supreme Court has ex-
pressed its preference for subsequent pun-
ishment rather than allowing prior re-
straint.82 A system involving any form 
of prior restraint on speech bears a heavy 
presumption against its constitutional 
validity.83 
In M.S. News Co. v. Casado,84 the court 
rejected a prior restraint argument for two 
reasons. First, there is no provision in the 
ordinance for a prior administrative deter-
mination of whether the material involved 
is obscene.85 Second, there was no signifi-
cant risk that a person may be prosecuted 
for engaging in protected conduct. 86 
Since the Maryland bill was first intro-
duced, 'various persons and organizations 
have expressed reservations about the bill. 
State Senator Mike Miller, Jr., Chairman 
of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Com-
mittee, expressed his fear that the bill 
would have a "chilling effect" on artists.87 
A local ' organization known as the Record-
ing Retailers Opposing Censorship (RROC) 
expressed its view that "[t]he action not 
only violates the recording artists' consti-
tutional right to free speech, but usurps 
parental responsibility for children's de-
velopment." 88 The RROC also found it 
unconscionable that the legislature would 
decide for parents what music their chil-
dren should listen to and take the right of 
judgment on impressionability from the 
parents' hands.89 Rock musician Frank 
Zappa, who testified in opposition of the 
bill, stated that the bill would force artists 
to censor their work in order to comply 
with the act.90 Another opponent of the 
bill, Barry Lynn of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, stated that "[t]he bill is 
absurd and unconstitutional, and goes be-
yond any accepted definition of obscen-
ity."91 While not getting involved in the 
Maryland bill, the PMRC has stated that 
it does not endorse the legislative approach 
as a means of dealing with the problem. 92 
The Maryland bill must now be exam-
ined in terms of its constitutionality and 
practical effectiveness. While the present 
Maryland act has not been challenged on 
constitutional grounds, the Attorney Gen-
eral of Maryland has issued an Opinion 
advising the Governor as to the constitu-
tionality of a bill before the Maryland 
Legislature amending section 419.93 The 
Attorney General found two possible 
problem areas with that bill: (1) the por-
tion of the bill which applies to the cover 
of certain material fails to satisfy the re-
quirement of Miller that the work be "taken 
as a whole;" 94 and (2) the bill does not 
require that the proscribed material be 
"patently offensive" to the average person 
applying contemporary community stan-
dards.95 The Opinion stated that the dis-
semination of material to minors which is 
indecent and offensive, but not necessarily 
obscene, could be constitutionally re-
stricted.96 This conclusion was based on 
the Supreme Court's holdings in Ginsberg 
and PaCIfica that a statute aimed at protect-
ing children need not meet the standards 
set forth in Miller. 97 
The act must also be examined in light 
of the decisions which have addressed sim-
ilar statutes.98 The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held that obscene materials are 
not subject to the protections of the First 
Amendment. 99 The Court, in Ginsberg, 
gave its approval to state statutes prohibit-
ing the distribution and display of material 
which is considered obscene to minors, 
but not obscene to adults. 100 The holdings 
of those courts which have examined simi-
lar statutes in light of Ginsberg will also 
help analyze the Maryland law's consti-
tutionality. 
The argument can easily be made that 
the Maryland act is unconstitutionally 
vague. The values that the Supreme Court 
has stated must be protected, and may all 
be offended by the bill. lol First, persons 
are not given fair and adequate warning of 
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what materials are prohibited. l02 Since 
records and tapes ha ve not previousl y been 
regulated, it will be hard for record retail-
ers to know which materials are obscene. 
Second, the lack of precise standards 
may permit the law to be enforced arbi-
trarily and discriminatorily.l03 Without a 
clear indication of what materials are pro-
hibited, law enforcement officials may ap-
ply their own standards which are not 
likely to be consistent. 
Finally, the statute may cause persons 
not to engage in activities that are consti-
tutionally protected, for fear that these ac-
tivities are prohibited. 104 The most likely 
group of persons to be affected are record 
and tape retailers, who may not sell various 
materials to minors although they may not 
be considered obscene. The statute could 
also have a chilling effect on the freedom 
of speech rights of recording artists, who 
may have to alter their work to comply 
with the law. lOS Since minors constitute a 
substantial portion of the record buying 
public, the artists may have to err on the 
side of cautiousness to prevent their records 
from not being able to reach that particular 
group. 
The Maryland bill is also subject to at-
tack on the ground that it is overbroad. 
The main purpose behind declaring a law 
to be unconstitutionally overbroad is to 
protect the dissemination of constitution-
ally protected materials. 106 It is the fear 
that this dissemination of protected ma-
terials will be prohibited which explains 
why this bill may be overbroad. 
While states are permitted to enact sta-
tutes which exercise a greater degree of 
control over the materials available to 
minors, the states may not do this at the 
expense of the constitutional rights of 
adults.l07 There are two major problems 
with the Maryland bill. First, the provi-
sion of the act prohibiting the display of 
materials which are in violation of the act 
denies access to these materials to adults. lOS 
Without displaying these records, adults 
will not be able to purchase these materials 
in many instances, because they will not 
know that these materials are available. 
Second, the terms of the act are more 
sweeping than those guidelines set forth in 
Miller and Ginsberg. 109 The guidelines in 
the Maryland act do not require that the 
materials be taken as a whole and they do 
not require that the materials be harmful 
to minors. While the Attorney General has 
stated that this discrepancy is not relevant 
because of the state's power to regulate 
indecent or offensive material as to chil-
dren,"O this power is not without its re-
strictions. The Supreme Court has held 
that the dissemination of protected ma-
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terials to minors may only be done in "rela-
tively narrow and well-defined circum-
stances." III The court in Pacifica did not 
overrule the holding in Ginsberg that states 
could prohibit the dissemination of ma-
terials which are obscene as to minors, but 
made its decision based on the context in 
which the communication was expressed. I 12 
The Maryland bill does not appear to 
make distinctions which would subject it 
to claims of unconstitutionality on equal 
protection grounds. 113 One argument 
which can be made is that the law distin-
guishes between those persons who dis-
tribute these obscene records and those 
persons who broadcast these same ma-
terials. The former are covered by the law, 
while the latter are not. However, while 
broadcasters are not subject to the law, 
their actions are subject to regulation in 
light of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Pacifica. 114 
The argument that the bill would be un-
constitutional as a prior restraint on the 
right of free speech is also likely to be un-
successful. While prior restraints on First 
Amendment rights are strongly disfavored 
by the courts, any such restraint, ifit does 
exist, is implied in the law. The two rea-
sons given by the court in M.S. News Co. 
v. Casado are also present here.ll5 First, 
the Maryland bill does not require that 
a prior administrative determination be 
. made as to whether the material is obscene. 
There is no requirement that a censor board 
screen every record before it is made avail-
able to the public. Second, there is no in-
dication that the law will be enforced in 
such a way as to provide a substantial risk 
of prosecution for engaging in protected 
activities. 1l6 
There are also several reasons why the 
enactment of H.B. III is impractical, as 
well as possibly unconstitutional. First, 
this is an area in which parents, and not the 
state, should be making the decision as to 
what their children should be listening to. 
The government should not step in and 
usurp the parents' rights and responsibili-
ties in raising their own children. Second, 
the determination of which records and 
tapes are obscene will be hard for police, 
prosecutors, and judges to make. There 
are no precise standards which can be used 
to define whether a particular record is ob-
scene. There are many songs whose lyrics 
are subject to different interpretations. 
The artists claim that the lyrics have one 
meaning, while groups such as the PMRC 
allege that the lyrics have another obscene 
meaning. 117 This creates a problem in de-
termining how far parties can go to find 
that a record violates the law. Third, the 
bill creates possible economic problems 
for record retailers. Since the bill prohibits 
the display of these materials, the retailers 
will be forced to remove the records from 
their display shelves and place them out of 
the public's view. This will substantially 
impair the sales of these records to all per-
sons because the displaying of these prod-
ucts is an integral part of the marketing 
and sales practice for records. Finally, the 
bill may have a reverse effect which could 
increase the problem. In many cases, the 
children who purchase these records are 
unaware of the explicit lyrics. By singling 
out certain records as obscene, this may in-
duce children to obtain these records and 
pay more attention to the lyrics. 
Despite the fact that H.B. III failed to 
be enacted into law by the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly in 1986, it is apparent that 
this bill, or a similar version of the bill, 
will be introduced again in 1987. While 
there are doubts as to the constitutionality 
of such a bill, there are stronger doubts as 
to its need and possible effectiveness. While 
acknowledging that many of the lyrics are 
offensive and tasteless, the legislators must 
be careful not to usurp the responsibilities 
of the parents in controlling the listening 
habits of their children. 
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